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New York law parallels federal law in its recognition of the
constitutional infirmities present in United States v. Jackson.9'
However, New York's plea bargain provisions, unlike the statute
in Jackson, have been upheld despite constitutional challenges,
because they require prosecutor and defendant to agree on a
prison sentence instead of permitting defendant to unilaterally
choose to avoid the risk of death. 91 This practice of plea
bargaining has "been repeatedly approved by Federal and New
York courts."'
Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals,
recognized as the policy-making tribunal of the State, 93 has
categorically endorsed the plea bargaining process. 94 The system
of negotiating sentences not only alleviates the great volume of
criminal prosecutions, "it provides a means where, by mutual
concessions, the parties may obtain a prompt resolution of
criminal proceedings with all the benefits that inure from final
disposition." 5

COUNTY COURT
DUTCHESS COUNTY
People v. McIntosh"
(decided August 4, 1997)

90 Id. at 690-91.

Id. at 693.
1 McIntosh, 173 Misc. 2d at 730, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
9 Hynes, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 692.
1 See People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 541 N.E.2d 1022, 543 N.Y.S.2d
968 (1989).
95Id. at 7, 541 N.E.2d at 1024, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 970 (noting the vital role
that plea bargaining plays in our criminal justice system, "enabl[ing] the
parties to avoid the delay and uncertainties of trial and appeal and permit[ing]
swift and certain punishment of law violators with sentences tailored to the
circumstances of the case at hand") (citation omitted).
9 173 Misc. 2d 727, 662 N.Y.S.2d 214 (Dutchess County Ct. 1997)
91
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Defendant, Dalkeith McIntosh, "move[d] for an order
invalidating and striking down Criminal Procedure Law
§ 220.10(5)[e] 9'... to the extent [it] provide[s] that a sentence of
death for the crime of first degree murder pursuant to Penal Law
§ 125.2798 can only be imposed upon a conviction after trial and
cannot be imposed as the result of a guilty plea."'
Defendant argued that this restriction infringes upon his Sixth
Amendment rights1° by denying defendant the opportunity to
seek a jury trial for fear that the penalty imposed after a jury trial
may exceed the severity of the penalty imposed if he entered a
plea of guilty. 0 1 In addition, defendant argued that Criminal
Procedure Law § 320.10102 should also be invalidated because it
97 N.Y. CRIM. PRo. LAW § 220.10(5)[e] (McKinney Supp. 1998). Section

220.10(5)[e] provides in pertinent part:
A defendant may not enter a plea of guilty to the crime of
murder in the first degree as defined in section 125.27 of the
penal law; provided, however, that a defendant may enter
such a plea with both the permission of the court and the
consent of the people when the agreed upon sentence is either
life imprisonment without parole or a term of imprisonment
for the class A-1 felony of murder in the first degree other
than a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.
Id.
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27 (McKinney 1998).
99 McIntosh, 173 Misc. 2d at 728, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 215.
'00 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent
9

part: " [I n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed." Id. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 which
provides in pertinent part: "A jury trial may be waived by the defendant in all
criminal cases, except in those in which the crime charged may be punishable
by death." Id.

10 McIntosh, 173 Misc. 2d at 728, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 215.
'm2
N.Y. CRiM. PRO. LAW § 320.10 (McKinney 1997).

Section 320.10

provides:

Except where the indictment charges the crime of murder in
the first degree, the defendant, subject to the provisions of
subdivision two, may at any time before trial waive a jury
trial and consent to a trial without a jury in the superior court
in which the indictment is pending.
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"forbids waiver of
a jury trial in cases involving charges of first
103
degree murder."
The court first addressed defendant's claim that his right to a
jury trial protected by the Sixth Amendment was violated by CPL
§ 220.10(5)[e]. ' 4 The court held that although defendant's claim
that he is coerced to forgo his right to a jury trial is not without
merit, '°5 "a State statute carries a strong presumption of validity
and ordinarily it should not be set aside as unconstitutional unless
such a conclusion is established beyond a reasonable doubt." 106
The court stated "it would be overstepping its bounds.., to
strike down [such a] statute." 10 7 Second, defendant's contention
that CPL § 320.10, which forbids waiver of jury trial in first
degree murder cases, should be invalidated, was also denied.,"
The court noted that defendant has no recognized "Federal
constitutional right to a bench trial in . . . capital case[s]."109

"[S]ince the New York State Constitution specifically forbids a
jury trial waiver ...

[in first degree murder cases], defendant's

motion to declare CPL § 320.10 unconstitutional is denied." "0
Indicted for first degree murder,"' defendant relied on U.S. v.
Jackson"2 as precedent for his motion to declare CPL
§ 220.10(5)[e] unconstitutional.13 In Jackson, the United States
Supreme Court held that the Federal Kidnapping Act "needlessly
03 McIntosh,

173 Misc. 2d at 728, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 215.
"04 Id. at 729, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
105 Id. The court also noted that there has been disagreement between two
New York Trial Judges on this point. Id. See also People v. Hale, 173 Misc.
2d 140, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. Kings County), rev'd sub nom. Hynes v.
Tomei, 666 N.Y.S.2d 687 (2d Dep't 1997) ("Under New York law, a
defendant may avoid the risk of death only by pleading guilty, waiving both
rights: his right to a jury trial, and his privilege against self-incrimination.").
See, e.g., People v. Chinn, N.Y. L.J, 11/19/96, p.31, col.3 (Mulroy, J.).
'01 McIntosh, 173 Misc. 2d at 734, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
107 id.

'08 Id. at 734-35, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
"'OId.at 735, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 220.
"0 Id.

"'
12

113

Id. at 728, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 215.

390 U.S. 570 (1968).
McIntosh, 173 Misc. 2d at 729, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 215-16.
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chilled a defendant's right to assert his innocence and to have a
trial."' The Act set forth no provision for defendants who plead
guilty to receive a death sentence, however, the Act did provide a
death sentence for those defendants who chose to exercise their
rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 5 Defendant
argued that CPL § 220.10(5)[e] similarly chills his right to a jury
trial because he is subject to a harsher penalty if he exercises his
116
rights protected by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
Defendant further argued that such restriction coerced him to
plead guilty in order to avoid the possibility of a death penalty
sentence."17

The McIntosh court distinguished United States v. Jackson from
the case at bar primarily by recognizing that the Federal
Kidnapping Act provided the defendant with the right to
unilaterally enter a guilty plea."' Here, CPL § 220.10(5)[e] does
not provide the defendant with a unilateral right to avoid a
possible death sentence." 9 In New York, there is a strong policy
set forth by the State to enforce the death penalty in heinous
crimes.'" Hence, a defendant accused of such a crime does not
have an automatic right to enter a plea of guilty and receive a less
severe penalty.'

114

Id. at 729, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 216. See Jackson, 390 U.S. at 581.

115

Jackson, 390 U.S. at 570-71.

See Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C.

§ 1201 (a) This section provides in pertinent part:
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate ...commerce,
any person who has been unlawfully... kidnapped... and
held for ransom ...or otherwise ...shall be punished (I)

by death if the kidnapped person has not been liberated
unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend,

or (2) by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if
the death penalty is not imposed."
Id.116
McIntosh, 173 Misc. 2d at 730, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
117 Id. at 728, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 215.
18 Id. at 729, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 215. See Jackson, 390 U.S. at 581.
"9 McIntosh, 173 Misc. 2d at 730, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
120
Id.
121 Id. at 729, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
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Under the New York statute at issue, a defendant is required to
receive the consent of the district attorney and the court in order
to enter a guilty plea." Herein lies the distinction between the
Federal Kidnapping Act and the statute at issue. The defendant
cannot unilaterally avoid the possibility of a death sentence under
the New York statute; whereas in the Federal Kidnapping Act,
the defendant could unilaterally avoid a death penalty sentence by
entering a plea of guilty.' m In the latter situation, there is a
greater potential for coercion to forgo constitutional protections in
order to avoid the death penalty. 124 The defendant is more likely
to voluntarily and unilaterally waive his rights protected by the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to insure that he will not be put to
death. '2
The McIntosh court discussed three other justifications for
upholding the constitutionality of CPL § 220.10(5)[e].' 6 First,
the court recognized that reserving the right to require the
defendant to stand trial for the accused crime and allowing the
defendant to negotiate with the district attorney and the court for
a more favorable sentence amounted to ordinary pleabargaining. 27 The court concluded that plea bargaining is vital to
the criminal justice system and without it, our system as we know
it, would deteriorate." Plea bargaining permits "conservation of
prosecutorial and judicial resources, . . . prompt resolution of

criminal proceedings with all the benefits that enure from final
disposition,...

and avoid[s] delay and [the] uncertainties of

trial and appeal. "'29
12Id. at 729-30, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
12

Id.
Id. at 733, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 218.

124

In Jackson, the defendant was needlessly encouraged to give
up his rights to plead guilty and to have a jury trial in order
to obtain the benefit of a non-death sentence, since nothing
other than the defendant's waivers of his right to maintain his
not guilty plea and his right to a jury trial had to occur. Id.
15 Id. at 733, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
'2 See infra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
'27 Mclntosh, 173 Misc. 2d at 730, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
1

28 Id.

129

Id. at 730, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 216-17.
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Second, the court discussed the bifurcated trial provision
inherent in capital punishment sentences.' m A verdict of guilty
entered against a defendant does not, in and of itself, render a
death sentence."' The defendant is allowed to introduce evidence
of mitigating circumstances and the jury may determine whether
or not a death sentence is warranted. 32 Therefore, a verdict of
guilty after trial does not automatically subject the defendant to
the death penalty.
Third, New York has taken the position that heinous crimes
should receive the harshest penalty. 33 Therefore, just as the
Jackson Court recognized that "a criminal defendant has no
absolute right to have his guilty plea accepted by the court," '3
New York has simply chosen to participate in the decision of
whether or not a defendant's plea will be accepted.'3 Moreover,
the McIntosh court noted that New York considered the
compelling public policy argument against allowing a plea of
guilty with a resulting death penalty sentence. 36 New York
concluded that allowing a guilty plea with a resulting death
sentence would amount to state assisted suicide and the State does
not want to assist a defendant in committing suicide. 31
The decision in McIntosh, and CPL § 220.10(5)[e] are in
accord with federal law.134 The Court in Jackson recognized that
a defendant's rights might be abridged when there is a coercive
provision that encourages needless waiver of Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights. 3 9 However, in Brady v. United States, 40
130

Id. at 732, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 217.

13' Id. "Further, under the current New York scheme a defendant, even if
found guilty after a jury trial, is not automatically subject to a death sentence."
Id.32
Id. at 732, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 217-18.
133 Id. at 730, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
13 United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 584 (1968) (citing Lynch v.
Overholser,
369 U.S. 705,719 (1962)).
135 McIntosh, 173 Misc. 2d at 731, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 217.
136 Id. at 732, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
137 Id.
138See
139

supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.

Jackson, 390 U.S. at 583. "Whatever the power of Congress to impose a

death penalty for violation of the Federal Kidnapping Act, Congress cannot
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decided two years after Jackson, the Court affirmed a guilty plea
under the Federal Kidnapping Act finding that the plea involved
in that case was validly entered, notwithstanding that defendant
might have been partially motivated by his fear of the death
penalty. 14' The Court based its decision on the absence of
coercive tactics. 142

Moreover, the Brady Court recognized the indispensable part
plea bargaining plays in our criminal justice system today. 143 The
ability of a defendant to negotiate with the State, even if such
negotiation leads to the waiver of certain rights is acceptable

practice.

44

It is this mutuality of advantage that perhaps
explains the fact that at present well over three-

fourths of the criminal convictions in this country
rest on pleas of guilty, a great many of them no
doubt motivated at least in part by the hope or
assurance of a lesser penalty than might be

impose such a penalty in a manner that needlessly penalizes the assertion of a
constitutional right." Id.
140 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
'4'

Id. at 755. The Court stated that:

[t]he standard as to the voluntariness of guilty pleas must be
essentially that defined by Judge Tuttle of the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit: 'a plea of guilty entered by one
fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual
value of any commitments made to him by the court,
prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by
threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment),
misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable
promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature
improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's
business (e.g. bribes).' Under this standard, a plea of guilty
is not invalid merely because entered to avoid the possibility
of a death penalty.
Id. (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957)
(en bane) rev'd on other grounds 356 U.S. 26 (1958)).
142

Id.

Id. at 749-52, See McIntosh, 173 Misc. 2d at 730, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 214.
'"Brady, 379 U.S. at 749-52.
141
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imposed if there were a guilty verdict after a trial
to judge or jury.145
Additionally, the court in McIntosh noted that "'[ t] he pleading
process necessarily includes the surrender of many guaranteed
rights but when there is no constitutional or statutory mandate and
no public policy prohibiting it, an accused may waive any right
which he or she enjoys.'" "

Ultimately, the McIntosh court affirmed the constitutionality of
CPL § 220.10(5)[e].147 In addition, defendant's claim that he was
entitled to waive a jury trial in favor of a bench trial was
unsupported by the Federal Constitution and specifically
forbidden by the New York Constitution.' 48

1451d. at 752.
146 Mclntosh, 173 Misc. 2d at 730, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 217 (quoting Schick v.
United States, 195 U.S. 65, 72 (1904)).
1'
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
148
McIntosh, 173 Misc. 2d at 735, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 220.
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